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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

GUARANTY NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 16207

BARBARA J. MORRIS,
Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE

This case arose out of a settlement for
personal injuries received by defendant/appellant,
hereinafter referred to as "defendant", in which
plaintiff/respondent, hereinafter referred to as "plaintiff", claimed a right to full reimbursement for nofault benefits it paid to defendant by way of Personal
Injury Protection payments (hereinafter referred to as
P.I.P.), without any responsibility for a proportionate
share of the attorneys'

fees and costs incurred by

defendant in securing that settlement.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted plaintiff's Motion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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for Summary Judgment (R. 12-13) and denied defendant's
corresponding Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 16-17) on
the basis that plaintiff had " • . • no obligation to
the defendant . . • for attorneys' fees or costs with
respect to the subrogated interests asserted by (plaintiff)

.

to . . .

. for the no-fault payment and benefits paid
(defendant)."

(R. 84).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the order
granting Summary Judgment to plaintiff and an entry of
Summary Judgment in defendant's favor.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This matter was submitted to the lower court
upon a Stipulation of Facts and Exhibits (R. 52-81)
which properly reflect the facts material to a determination of this matter.

Summarizing those items,

defendant was injured in an auto accident on December
16, 1975, by an individual insured by State Farm Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as "State Farm").
Following that accident, plaintiff paid
defendant $2,787.61 in no-fault insurance benefits and
notified State Farm of its claim for reimbursement of
those benefits on June 24, 1976 (R. 74).

On November
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9, 1976, plaintiff was advised by State Farm that
defendant had obtained the services of an attorney and
that its subrogation demand could not be considered
until defendant's liability claim had been resolved (R.
75).

On February 22, 1977, State Farm advised plaintiff

of the name of defendant's attorney and that negotiations were still pending (R. 76).

On December 22,

1977, defendant executed a release and settled with
State Farm for $14,000.00 prior to filing suit, which
release specifically provided that, in return for the
amount paid, the defendant "releases and forever discharges" State Farm's insureds, "none of whom admit any
liability to the undersigned but all expressly deny any
liability"

(R. 77).
Pursuant to plaintiff's asserted subrogation

rights as provided in the insurance contract (R. 73, 75
and 80-P.I.P. Endorsement, Section 1. Conditions,
paragraphs

(d)

and

(e)

) , two checks were issued by

State Farm in connection with the settlement:

one

payable to defendant and her attorney in the sum of
$11,212.39; and one payable to plaintiff and defendant's
attorney in the sum of $2,787.61

(R. 77).

On January

6, 1978, defendant's attorney advised plaintiff of
the settlement and that the no-fault payments, to be
paid out of the $1~.000.00 settlement, pGrsuant to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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plaintiff's subrogation claim, would be subject to a
regular l/3 contingency fee of $928.27 as its proportionate share of the attorneys' fees, which fee was
based upon the contingency fee agreement executed
between defendant and her attorneys.

(R. 78-79).

Plaintiff denied responsibility for any
attorneys'

fees or costs relative to the amounts

recovered in its behalf (R. 80-81) and brought this
action for a declaration that it was not responsible
for such fees and for a release of any claim by defendant to those funds

(R. 1-3).

Defendant answered and

by way of Counterclaim, asserted her rights to have
plaintiff bear its proportionate share of the attorney's
fees and costs of $928.27

(R. 9-10).

Motions for

Summary Judgment based upon these facts, were filed by
both parties and, after a hearing thereon without a
transcript, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge, entered
an Order granting plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying defendant's corresponding Motion.

It

is from that Order that defendant appeals.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD NO OBLIGATION TO DEFENDANT FOR ATTORNEYS'
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FEES OR COSTS WITH RESPECT TO THE
SUBROGATED INTERESTS ASSERTED.
As pointed out in the Statement of Facts,
prior to any settlement, plaintiff was aware that a
claim was being made by defendant against State Farm's
insured and that its subrogation claim would not be
considered until that claim had been determined.

Yet,

plaintiff took no action whatsoever to aid in the prosecution of defendant's claim or even to prosecute its
own claim, choosing, instead, to await the outcome of
defendant's efforts.

Nor did plaintiff, at any time,

suggest to defendant, or her attorneys, that they
should not make any claim for the $2,787.61 for which
plaintiff sought reimbursement.

Only after the neces-

sary expenditure of work, labor, and effort by defendant and her attorneys to secure the recovery did
plaintiff make demand for the full amount of its
subrogation claim, without any off-set for the attorneys'

fees or other expenses incurred in securing those

monies.

Plaintiff now claims that no such fees are

provided for in the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance
Act, §31-41-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno.
therefore, may not be allowed.

(1953), and,

That Section provides:

(1)
Every insurer authorized to write the
insurance required by this act shall agree as a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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condition to being allowed to continue to write
insurance in the State of Utah:
(a)
That where its insured is or
would be held legally liable for the personal
injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits
~equired under this act have been paid by another
~nsurer, including the state insurance fund, it
will reimburse such other insurer for the payment
of such benefits, but not in excess of the amount
of damages so recoverable, and
(b)
That the issue of liability
for such reimbursement and the amount of same
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration
between the insurers.
Id.
While it is true, as plaintiff contends, that
no attorney's fees are provided for in that section, it
must also be noted that no "subrogation" is provided
for either.
That section contemplates only arbitration
between insurance companies as does the act itself.
The plaintiff, rather than taking his chances pursuant
to the artibration provisions referred to, chose
instead to proceed under its contractual subrogation
rights

(R. 76, 78, 79, 80, 81) by asserting a lien upon

any recovery secured by the defendant.

By doing this

the provisions of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, Supra., then become inapplicable and basic
equitable principles of subrogation should be looked to
as controlling.
The right of subrogation is an equitable
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principle, designed to prevent a plaintiff from recovering twice, once from the company insuring her and
once from the company insuring the tort-feasor, thereby
preventing an unjust enrichment of the insured.
Needless to say, the plaintiff now argues that it is
entitled to money for which it made no effort to obtain
recovery and for which it paid none of the expenses of
recovery.

To allow the defendant to recover its total

expenditures without bearing its fair share of the
expenses of recovery would truly constitute unjust
enrichment and is most certainly contrary to the principles of equity.
This proposition has continuously been admitted by fair-minded insurance companies.

In the case of

Transamerica Insurance Co. vs. Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101,
505 P.2d 783

(1972),

(a case whose facts and issues are

quite similar to this case), the insurer-plaintiff
openly admitted that it owed the defendant-insured for
the costs of recovery.
Plaintiff claims that it is entitled to reimbursement to the extent of $1,000.00 less a
reasonable attorney's fee and its proportionate
share of the costs from the fund recovered by
defendant from the tort-feasors.
Id. at 785 ·
Plaintiff believes that this is the only reasonable and
honest solution to the question of distribution of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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settlement proceeds between an insured and a subrogated
insurer.
The law in this area is clearly set forth in
44 Am.Jur.2d, §1845 and §1846:
The general rule is that the insured may
retain out of the fund recovered from the
wrongdoer, after the payment of the policy,
the costs and reasonable expenses incurred in
the litigation, for it would be unjust to
re uire him to incur e enses for the
recovery of money for the benef1t o the
insurer, without being allowed to reimburse
himself.
Id.
This same general rule is expressed in an
annotation "Attorney's Fee- Recovery From Insurer", 2
ALR.3d 1441. The annotation states that:
In the cases which hold that the subrogated
property insurer is obligated to pay a fee to
the insured's attorney, who recovered damages
from a third party, the courts generally rely
on general equitable principles, and, in some
cases, point out that the insurer did not
participate in the action against the third
party.
Id. at 1443.
With respect to the minority position, where
the right to a fee is denied, the same annotation
states:
A very few cases which hold or indicate that
an insured's attorney was not entitled to a
fee out of that part of the recovery from the
tort-feasor belonging to the insurance carrier, have been found. These decisions rest
on asserted principles of equity, or on the
fact that the property insurer participated
and assisted in the recovery, or at least

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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attempted to do so.

2 ALR.3d 1145-1146.

Plaintiff's lack of assistance and participation in the recovery is admitted and, therefore,
plaintiff does not fall within the confines of the
minority rule.

On the contrary, under the equitable

considerations of the majority rule, plaintiff must
bear a pro-rata share of the attorneys'

fees and

expenses incurred by defendant in recovering the monies
at issue.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Elkins, 451 SW.2d 528

(1970), the trial court allowed

the insured to deduct a pro-rata share of the attorney's
fees and expenses from the portion of the judgment
which accrued to the insurer's benefit under its subrogation rights.

In affirming the trial court's

decision, the appellate court stated:
The principle that the insurer can
recover payments made to the insured, after
insured recovers from the tort-feasor is
based upon equity and that the insurance is a
contract of indemnity.
Hayward v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 212 Minn.
500, 4 NVJ.2d 316, 140 A.I..R. 1236 (1942);
Manley v. Montgomery Bus Co., 82 Pa.Super.
530 (1924); Home Ins. Co. v. Slater, 28
Del. Co. R. (Pa.) 546 (1939); Cedarholm v.
State Farm Mutual Insurance Companies, 81
Idaho 136, 338 P.2d 93 (1959); Natlonal
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 278 Minn. 45,
153 NY/. 2d 152 (1967).
In the above cited cases, where the
insurer has recovered aaainst the insured,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the

ro-rata cost and e
~n obta~n~ng t e money are
rne
b~ the insurer.
Camden Fire Ins. Ass 1 n v.
M~ssouri K & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, SUfla;
Hayward v. State Farm Mutual Automob~ e
Insurance Companies, hupd?· The proceeds
owed to the insurer w o ~d not assist in
their collection, must bear the cost and
expense of their collection.
(Emphasis
added).
4~1 aw.2d at 531-32.
~nsured

See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. W.P. Rose
Supply Co., 19 N.C.App. 302, 198 SE.2d 482 (1973),
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Clinton, 518
P.2d 645

(Ore. 1974).
A similar result was reached in Cedarholm

v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Companies, 81 Idaho 136,
338 P.2d 93

(1959).

A husband and wife, injured in an

automobile accident, brought an action against the
tort-feasor after being partially reimbursed by their
insurer.

A settlement was reached, and (similar to the

present factual situation), two checks were delivered
by the defendant to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs then

brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to have
the draft made out to the respondent-insurer turned
over to them.

The respondent-insurer claimed the full

amount under its subrogation rights.

The Idaho Supreme

Court ruled that:
Recovery by the respondent under its
right of subrogation, however, is subject to
reduction by the amount appellants expended
for collection.
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The general rule is that the insured may
retain out of the fund recovered from the
wrongdoer, after the payment of the policy,
the costs and reasonable expenses incurred in
the litigation, for it would be unjust to
require him to incur expenses for the recovery of money for the benefit of the insurer,
without being allowed to reimburse himself. *
* *
338 P.2d at 96.
It is clear that the courts throughout the
nation have held that an insured is entitled to recover
from his insurer a pro-rata share of his attorney's
fees and expenses incurred in an action against the
tort-feasor where the insurer was subrogated to a
portion of the amount recovered.

(See also Iowa

National Mutual Insurance Company v. Huntley, 328 P.2d
569

(Wyo.

1958); Commercial Standard Insurance Company

of Ft. Worth Texas v. Combs, 460 &W.2d 770 (Ark.,
1970); Krause v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,
184 Neb.

588, 169 NW.2d 601

Wooley, 521 P.2d 793

(Neb., 1969); and Carter v.

(Okla., 1974)

).

This court has dealt with the relationship of
subrogation rights and equity in the case of Transamerica
Insurance Co. v. Barnes, supra.

In that case, this

court established the guidelines that should apply to
this case:
Equitable principles apply to subrogation,
and the insured is entitled to be made whole
before the insurer may recover any portion of
the recovery from the tort-feasor.
If the
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one responsible has paid the full extent of
the loss, the insurer should not claim both
sums, and the insurer may then assert its
claims to subrogation.
Subrogation is not a
matter of right, but may be invoked only in
those circumstances where justice demands its
applications, and the rights of the one
seeking subrogation have a greater equity
than the one who opposes him. Subrogation is
not permitted where it will work any injustice to others.
To entitle one to subrogation, the equities of one's case must be
strong, as equity will, in general, relieve
only those who could not have relieved
themselves.
Id. at 786.
Thus, while the plaintiff may be entitled to
recover the P.I.P. payments paid to defendant under
a subrogation theory, it must, equitably, bear its
proportionate share of the expenses incurred by defendant in recovering those payments from the tort-feasor's insurance company.
Plaintiff's claim that it was required to
arbitrate under the facts of this case completely
misconceives the basic purpose of the No-Fault Act,
supra.

It is clear that its arbitration provisions

were meant only to apply to a simple matter in which
all expenses incurred by the insured in an accident do
not exceed $500.00 and have been paid by the insurer,
and the only reconciliation to be reached was between
the two insurance companies.

(A settlement which in no

way affects the rights of the insured).

The same pro-

visions are clearly inadequate to handle the equitable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
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considerations which arise when the insurer is only
required to pay a small portion of the total damages
incurred by the insured, and the insured then is forced
to take action, by way of suit or otherwise, to recover
from the tort-feasor his total damages and concommitantly to protect her own rights as well as the
subrogation rights of the insurer.

When this happens,

the principles of subrogation become operative and the
arbitration provisions of the No-Fault Act, supra.,
become inoperative.
In either event, plaintiff's rights are protected.

If plaintiff's expenditures on behalf of the

insured are the only damages sustained by the insured,
plaintiff may then arbitrate with the tort-feasor's
insurance company to recover the amount it expended.
If the insured has sustained damage in addition to the
amounts expended by plaintiff, then plaintiff may
recover those amounts under the
specifically
insurance

subrogation

reserved by plaintiff

policy

(R.

73).

in

rights

the P.I.P.

The presence of a subro-

gation clause in plaintiff's own P.I.P. policy is
clearly indicative of the fact that even plaintiff
anticipated subrogation situations would occur in
connection with the payment of P.I.P. benefits.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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By relying on the No-Fault Act's requirement
of mandatory arbitration, plaintiff is simply trying to
take back the entire amount which was paid to its
insured under a paid for contract of insurance without
having to share in the labor, efforts, expenses, and
risks incurred in collecting such amounts.
A direct parallel can be drawn between the
present case, its applicable statutory guidelines, and
an analogous area of the law concerning workmen's compensation.

Under the Utah Workmen's Compensation laws,

§31-1-1, et

~·

Utah Code Anno.

(1953), the extent to

which the employee-claimant can recover, and the context within which he can bring suit to recover from the
third party-tort-feasor involved is all a matter of
statutory regulation.

Yet in this area, given a

situation wherein the employee-claimant brings suit to
recover his damages from the negligent third party, the
Utah statutes expressly provide that a reasonable
attorney's fee shall be awarded for the efforts of the
employee-claimant's attorney.
Code Anno.

See §35-1-62(2), Utah

(1953).
In interpreting the Workman's Compensation

statute, supra., this court has stated that the reasonable expenses of the action, including contingent
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attorney's fees,

should be paid and charged proportion-

ately against the parties (the injured employee and the

insurer) as their interests appear.
This equitable doctrine was first ennunciated
by the Utah Supreme Court in a well-reasoned opinion
in the case of Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc.,
16 U.2d 80, 426 P.2d 223 (1967), and has been repeatedly
cited in the workmen's compensation area as the controlling law.
The Worthen doctrine, supra., was followed in
a later workmen's compensation case, Lanier v. Pyne, 29
U.2d 249, 508 P.2d 38

(1973).

In Lanier, the insurance

company attempted the same agrument that defendant is
now making and contended that it had not hired the
plaintiff's attorneys and should not be required to
bear a proportionate share of the attorney's fees and
costs incurred.

The court responded as follows:

However, by indulging in a process of
rationalization, and by following a procedure
presently to be stated, Liberty Mutual
(insurer of the injured employee) contends
that notwithstanding the amendment, it is
still not obliged to bear any portion of
plaintiff's attorney's fees.
This contention
is based on the following propositions: that
by reason of its right of subrogation, it
properly intervened in the actlon; that
inasmuch as it would be required to pay
attorney's fees, it should be privileged to
choose its own attorneys; that it notified
the plaintiff and his attorneys that it did
not desire their representation; and that its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may -15contain errors.

own attorneys would protect its interests
Liberty Mutual does not disagree with the.
cases above referred to, but asserts that
this one is different because in none of them
doe7 it appear that the plaintiff was put on
not~ce, as he was here, that the insurance
carrier had hired its own counsel and would
protect its own interest.
It thus raises
what it asserts to be the sole issue in this
case:
that when it has thus hired its own
counsel and given such notice, it is not
required to participate in proportional
payment of the costs and attorney's fees
incurred by the plaintiff.
Considerations of reason and policy
impel the conclusion that the plaintiff,
the one who has suffered the injury and
damage, should have basic ownership and
control of his cause of action.
It is most
natural to suppose that he w~ll try to obtain
the maximum possible recovery.
Id. at 39-40.
(Emphasis Added.)
The plaintiff respectfully asserts that the
equitable considerations in these two areas of the law
are identical with regard to the rights of an insured
to recover for his total losses and the rights of the
insurer to be subrogated to this recovery to the extent
of any amounts paid to the insured by his insurer.

It

is clear that the insurer in both situations should
rightfully bear a portion of the expenses incurred by
the injured parties in recovering a fund from which
both parties will share.
The defendant acknowledges plaintiff's rights
to be subrogated to the recovery by her to the extent
of the payments for special damages made by her insurer
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to her.

It is equally clear under the general rules of

law and equity and the majority of decisions hold that
the plaintiff herein is liable for a pro-rata share of
the expenses incurred, including attorney's fees, in
recovering the amounts to which it is entitled.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT, IF SECTION 31-41-11
UTAH CODE ANNO. (1953), AS AMENDED,
PRECLUDES DEFENDANT'S RECOVERY OF
A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS IN THIS MATTER, SUCH
PROVISION WOULD NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE
I, SEC. 11, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
The plaintiff has completely misconceived the
basis of the defendant's causes of action and the
language and effect of the Utah No-Fault Act, supra.
The plaintiff claims that the No-Fault Act prohibits a
suit to recover its interest and specifically limits it
to binding arbitration.
Such an interpretation of the Act would
render it unconstitutional on the grounds that it woulC
violate an injured party's constitutional rights of due
process of

la~

and equal protection under the laws,

under both the state and federal Constitutions.
Particularly applicable is the due process provision of
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Article I, Sec. 11; of the Constitution of Utah:
Sec. 11.
All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this State, by him-self or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party.
Under the interpretation of the No-Fault Act
asserted by the plaintiff, the only damages for which
the defendant could bring an action would be those in
excess of any amounts already paid to her by her insurer.
Apparently, plaintiff would then assert that it alone
has the right to seek reimbursement for the damages it
has paid, through the binding, compulsory arbitration
called for under the Act.
This entire characterization of the process
of adjudication proposed by the plaintiff is directly
contrary to the requirement in Utah law, as well as in
a majority of jurisdictions, that a single cause of
action may not be split.

The general rule on splitting

causes of action is discussed in 140 ALR 1245 and 1
Am.Jur.2d 651.
169 P.2d 777

In Cedarloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 45,

(1946), this court dealt with the splitting

of a cause of action and stated:
even though the insurance company
is subrogated to a part of the claim of the
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plaintiff, against the defendant, that does
not create another cause of action and there
can only be one suit to recover on that cause
of action.
169 P.2d at 780.
See also Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114,
152 P.2d 98

(1944), and Rayner v. Hi-Line Transport,

Inc., 15 U.2d 427, 394 P.2d 383

(1964).

The defendant is entitled to bring an action
for the full damages incurred, including those for
which it received partial payment from her insurer.
The defendant would then naturally anticipate that her
insurer would receive payment, under its subrogation
rights, for the amount it had paid to her less its
proportionate share of the expenses incurred in bringino the act1on.

This would insure that neither party

would be unjustly enriched at the expense of the other.
To require her to commence an action in any other
manner would violate her constitutional rights to a
full and total adjudication of her claim.
There is still another line of reasoning
under which the plaintiff'a assertions violate the
de~endant's

constitutional rights.

were precluded

fro~

If an injured party

!-'resenting evidence of medical,

hospital and other expenses simply because she had been
reimbursed for her e'penditures, such a law would
violate her riGhts because it 1,·ould

den~·

her "remedy by
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due course of law" and would deprive her of her property without due process of law.

If a plaintiff were

precluded from introducing evidence of doctor's bills,
hospital and drug expenses, and other insurable losses,
she would effectively be precluded from presenting the
most effective evidence of her damage and would most
likely receive less than that to which she was rightfully entitled.
Defendant, therefore, respectfully asserts
that certain provisons of the Utah No-Fault Act supra.,
and specifically those under Section 31-41-11, supra.,
relative to the mandatory, binding arbitration between
the insurers, is unconstitutional in its effect upon
the defendant, if it is to be interpreted as claimed by
the plaintiff.

Application of those provisions, as

interpreted by the plaintiff would violate the defendant's constitutional rights in that they would deny
her "remedy by due course of law" and would deprive her
of her property without due process of law.

CONCLUSION
Defendant is entitled to have plaintiff bear
its fair share of the attorney's fees and costs expended
in connection with securing a recovery of defendant's
da~aoes and the amounts expended by plaintiff in
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defendant's behalf.
At no time until plaintiff's monies had been
recovered by the defendant did plaintiff claim that
it should not pay a proportionate share of those costs.
Because subrogation principles are applicable
to this case, as admitted by plaintiff in its

conduct

and in its insurance policy, plaintiff cannot now
attempt to escape its responsibility to bear its proportionate share of the burden by relying on the provisions of a statute which is not applicable to the
facts of this case.
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment in
her favor.
DATED this 15th day of March, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
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